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SOLICITATION OF ASSENTS TO
RAILROAD REORGANIZATION PLANS UNDER
SECTION 20b OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT
SECTION 20b of the Interstate Commerce Act, enacted in 1948,1 is Con-
gress' most recent attempt to provide a fair and efficient procedure for the
reorganization of railroad carriers.2 If the statute's substantive criteria are
met,3 the Interstate Commerce Commission may allow carriers to modify
all of their securities, except equipment trust certificates. 4 Court approval is
unnecessary ri to make a modification binding on all parties ;O consummation
1. 62 STAT. 163 (1948), 49 U.S.C. §20b (Supp. 1951). The legislation is often cited
as the "Mahaffie Act," after Charles D. Mahaffie, former chairman of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, its reputed author. For general surveys of the background and sub-
stantive aspects of the statute, see Hand & Cummings, Consensual Securities Modifieation,
63 HARv. L. Rv. 957 (1950); The Railroad Modification Law, 48 Cot. L. Rav. 689
(1948) ; Oliver, The Railroad Readjustment Act, 15 I.C.C. PnAc. J. 527 (1948) ; Polatsek,
The Wreck of the Old 77, 34 CoRX. L. Q. 532 (1949); Comment, 58 YALE LJ. 1291
(1949); Note, 1 STAN. L. REv. 676 (1949).
2. The now defunct Chapter XV of the Bankruptcy Act, 53 STAT. 1134 (1939), 56
STAT. 787 (1942), was an earlier, but short-lived, attempt at consensual securities modi-
fication. See Will, Chapter XV of the Bankruptcy Act-An American Adaptation of the
Fait Accompli, 7 U. or Cm. L. Ray. 203 (1940). Section 20b was itself preceded by
several other bills, one of which was vetoed by President Harry S. Truman. See Memo-
randum of Disapproval, Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Comnonerce on S. 249, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1947).
3. The ICC must find the submitted plan to be "in the public interest; .. . in the
best interests of the carrier, of each class of its stockholders, and of the holders of each
class of its obligations affected" by the plan, and not "adverse to the interests of any
creditor of the carrier not affected" by the proposed modification. 62 STAT. 163 (1948),
49 U.S.C. § 20b(2) (Supp. 1951). For an analysis of ICC interpretation of 20b standards,
see Wren, Feasibility and Fairness in Section 20b Reorganizations, 52 COL. L. REV. 715
(1952) ; Hand & Cummings, Funding Arrcarages under SectiomJ 20b of the Interstate
Commerce Act, 65 HARv. L. REv. 398 (1952) ; Comment, 61 YALe L.J. 656, 676-82 (1952).
4. Section 20b(1).
5. Unlike the traditional statutory provision for constant, and de novo, court parti-
cipation in bankruptcy reorganization proceedings, e.g., 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), as amended,
11 U.S.C. §205 (1946), 20b contains no mention whatever of judicial review. Challenge
of an approved 20b plan can thus be made only by way of a limited administrative review
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1336, 2101 (a), 2284, 2321-25 (Supp. 1950), in which courts will be
confined to a determination of whether ICC holdings were supported by any "rational"
evidence. See Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S, 282, 286
(1934); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R.R., 222 U.S. 541, 547-8
(1912).
6. Dissenters from a 20b plan have no right to demand cash payment from the cor-
poration for their securities. Contrast the appraisal statutes which, in forty-three juris-
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of a submitted plan is contingent solely on ICC sanction and the assentns-
excluding those within the control of the carrier or any person controlling
the carrier 7-- of at least 75 percent of the shares or principal amount out-
standing of each class of affected securities.8 Clearly, the absence of judicial
supervision poses no threat to the interests of management, which retains
the initiative to file or withdraw 20b applications,0 or to institutional investors,
whose relatively large holdings may grant them a veto power over any plan
which they believe affects them adversely.' But the small investor, without
the money or skill to protect his interest," must depend on the astuteness of
the Commission and the reliability of the assent solicitation process to block
over-reaching by management or other dominant groups.'' Aside from ICC
supervision, the required percentage of assents, unusually high for a reorgani-
zation procedure, 13 appears on its face to be an imposing shield for the small
dictions, ease the burden of various forms of consensual securities mQdificatiun by requir-
ing such purchase. Note, 60 YA E L.J. 337 n.1 (1951). See, generally, BLt.A,'xs.c, Con-
1o3ATI oS §§ 298, 299 (rev. ed. 1946), STLi s, Conrt:-mATbois § 12S (2d ed. 1949). For
a recent critique of appraisal statutes, see Note, 3S V.%. L Ru 915 (1952).
7. Section 20b(3).
S. Section 20b(2). However, if fewer than 25 persons hold 75 percent or mvre of
outstanding securities in an affected class, the ICC may require a percentage of assents
higher than the usual 75. Ibid. See Boston & Maine R.R. Securities Mudification, 275
I.C.C. 397, 421-2 (1950) (87 percent required for noncumulative preferred stock).
9. Section 20b(2). Several 20b applications have been withdrawn. See 65 ICC ANNw.
REP. 34 (1951); 63 ICC A.TNN. REP. 26 (1949); 62 ICC ANN. RI,'. 31 (1948).
10. Thus the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, owner uf all outstanding cllateral
trust 4-percent bonds of the Bangor & Aroostook R.R., could easily have bloched any
uncongenial ZOb plan. See Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C.
369, 370 (1950). One writer has estimated that at least half of all outstanding railrvad
bonds are owned by insurance companies and banks. HO.%GL.D, ConaionATIo:N F,:ANC
655 (3d ed. 1947).
11. "Courts of Equity have a tradition of aiding the helpless, such as Infants, Iditts,
and Drunkards. The average security holder in a corporate reorganization is of lize
kind." Frank, Some Realistic Reflectiois on Some Aspects of Curporate Reorganization,
19 V. L. REV. 541, 569 (1933). See last paragraph of note 44 infra.
12. See Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C. 499 k1959)
(application denied) ; Maine Central R.R. Securities Modification, V75 I.C.C. 261 (1950)
(same). The M-K-T has filed a new 20b application, an avowed purpose of which is tj
maintain the present management's control of the road. N. Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1953, p. 32,
col 2.
Carriers need not justify even the most drastic 20b plan with proof of present or im-
pending insolvency. See, e.g., Boston & Maine R.R. Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C.
397, 412 (1950). Nor, probably, need plans adhere to the standard of "full priority" in
securities allocation to senior security interests. Hand & Cummings, Fu:ding Arrcarages
Under Section 20b of the Interstate Comnerce Act, 65 HAn~v. L. REV. 393 (1952) ; Cos-
sensual Securities Modification, 63 HAzv. L. R.tv. 957, 981-84 (1950) ; Comment, 61 Y,%-
L.. 656 (1952). Compare these views with Wren, Feasibility and Fairm:ess it: Section
20b Reorganizations, 52 COL. L_ R,. 715 (1952).
13. Both state and federal corporate reorganization procedures cust.nmarily prvide,
for the ratification of any reorganization plan by given percentages uf a company's Eecuri-
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investor's protection; its efficacy, however, depends on the practices by which
assents may be obtained.
Section 20b itself offers few guides to aid the ICC in the formulation of
rules for assent solicitation. The statute provides that "all letters, circulars,
advertisements, and other communications" to be used in soliciting, or
opposing, assents must first be submitted to the ICC for approval of the
"correctness and sufficiency" of the material facts contained therein.14 Be-
yond this, the ICC is left free to devise its own rules and regulations regard-
ing the submission of 20b plans to security holders. 1r Emphasizing this broad
discretion is a specific provision which makes the Security and Exchange
Commission's proxy rules inapplicable to 20b proceedings.10 The ICC, in
passing on ten 20b plans during the past five years,1" has evolved a series of
general solicitation rules. Carriers are permitted to employ professional soli-
citors who may use personal contact to obtain assents.13 Normally the Com-
mission will not, nor are opponents allowed to, inspect the accuracy of the
ty holders-but none imposes as high an assent requirement as that found in 20b. Com-
pare 20b's provision (75 percent of each class of affected securities) with the assent re-
quirement for reorganizations under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 47 STAT. 1474
(1933), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1946) (two-thirds of those votig), or under
Chapter XI readjustments, 52 STAT. 905 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 762 (1946) (simple majority
of all creditors), or under state charter amendment procedures, e.g., DzL. REV. Corz, C.
65, §26 (1935) (majority of stock eligible to vote) ; N.J. REV. STA'r. § 14.11-2 (1937)
(two-thirds); N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW Art. IV, § 37(a) (b) (c) (majority or two-thirds).
14. Section 20b(2).
15. The Commission is given the power: "to make such rules and regulations appro-
priate to its administration of the provisions of [Section 20b] as it shall deem necessary
or desirable," 62 STAT. 163 (1948), 49 U.S.C. §20b(10) (Supp. 1951); to attach to any
plan "such terms, conditions, and amendments, if any, as the Commission shall have deter-
mined to be just and reasonable," 62 STAT. 163 (1948), 49 U.S.C. §20b(3) (Supp. 1951) ;
"to cause the carrier, in such manner as it [the ICC] shall direct, to submit the pro-
posed alteration or modification" to security holders. 62 STAT. 163 (1948), 49 U.S.C.
§20b(2) (Supp. 1951).
16. Section 20b(9).
17. Macon, Dublin & Savannah R.R. Bond Modification, 271 I.C.C. 376 (1948);
Central R.R. of N.J. Securities Modification, 271 I.C.C. 501 (1949) ; Lehigh Valley R.R.
Securities Modification, 271 I.C.C. 553 (1949); Southern Ry. Abandonment (Atlantic
& Danville Ry. Securities Modification), 271 I.C.C. 605 (1949); Montana, Wyoming &
Southern R.R. Securities Modification, 271 I.C.C. 779 (1949); Maine Central R.R.
Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C. 261 (1950); Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Securities
Modification, 275 I.C.C. 369 (1950); Boston & Maine R.R. Securities Modification, 275
I.C.C. 397 (1950); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C. 499
(1950) ; Maryland & Pennsylvania R.R. Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C. 695 (1950).
All but the Maine Central and the M-K-T plans won Commission approval.
18. "[T]he applicant may retain the services of one or more firms specializing in
such work to assist in solicitation; . . . reasonable provision may be made for the conl-
pensation of brokers in connection with the solicitation of assents; and ... such solicita-
tion may be carried on by personal interview, mail, telephone, and telegraph.. . ." Central




recordation of assents.10 To aid in opposing 20b plans, dissenters may either
obtain the names of other security holders from the carrier, or, if the carrier
refuses to disclose its lists, pay the carrier to mail opposition literature.20
In no case, however, will dissenters receive reimbursement from the carrier
for campaign expenses.21
The first court test of a 20b plan 2 provides a framework for a critical
examination of the Commission's rules. In Sakis v. United States, dis-
gruntled preferred shareholders of the Boston & Maine Railroad sought to
invalidate a plan which the ICC and the requisite number of security holders
had approved.24 Part of the plaintiffs' attack was aimed at the ICC's solicita-
tion rulings.2z The challenge was aided by an unexpected Justice Department
19. "To grant the intervener's request that they be given an opportunity to make an
individual investigation and inspection [of the recording process] such as they suggest
obviously would result in substantial further delay. In the complete absence of any evi-
dence, or even any allegation ... that any errors or irregularities occurred in the certi-
fying of the results of the submission, we must conclude that there is no justification for
thus delaying the consummation of this proceeding. . . . [W]e accept the depositary's
certification at its face value." Boston & Maine R.R. Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C.
752, 755-6 (1951). See notes 59-73 infra, and accompanying text.
20. "[T]he applicant shall supply to any holder of an affected security .. a reason-
ably current list of the names and addresses of the holders ... of the securities of the same
class as those of the holder making the request: or. as alternaties to supplving such list,
... may, if it so elects, mail, at the expense of such holder, copies of any material, the
correctness and sufficiency of which have been approved by us, proposed to be used by
such holder in connection with the solicitation of assents or dissents to the plan of altera-
tion and modification." Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C. 369,
395 (1950) (emphasis added). See note 47 infra.
21. "Under section 20b of the Interstate Commerce Act no provision is made for us
to authorize or direct payment by the applicant of compensation or reimbursement of e.x-
penses of parties to the proceedings. . . . [T]he petition [for reimbursement] will be
denied." Lehigh Valley R.R. Securities Modification, -71 I.C.C. 655, 658 (1949). See
notes 74-9 in!ra, and accompanying text.
22. An earlier challenge of 20b, which sought to invalidate the securities readjust-
ment granted in Macon, Dublin & Savannah R.R. Bond Modification, 271 I.C.C. 376
(1948), was dismissed on technical grounds. Holmes v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 894
(S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 927 (1950) (failure to edaust administrative remedies).
A projected appeal from ICC approval of the Lehigh Valley reorganization in Lehigh
Valley R.R. Securities Modification, 271 LC.C. 553 (1940), was withdrawn on motion of
the parties. 65 ICC ANN. RFa'. 160 (1951).
23. 103 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1952), dismissed by cotsent of partics, 344 U.S. 801
(1952).
24. Boston & Maine R.R. Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C. 752 (1951). To simpli-
fy the road's comple: capital structure, the plan required investors in the four outstanding
stock classes to surrender their securities for certain percentages of two new stock issues.
25. Also challenged were ICC findings on classification of Boston & Maine stod:,
rate of capitalization, and adherence of the plan to substantive 20b standards. In addi-
tion, plaintiffs claimed that 20b was unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and as an unlawful delegation of legislative powers. All
contentions were denied. Sakis v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1952) passim.
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investigation which produced numerous affidavits and depositions alleging
irregularities in the solicitation of assents to the plan.20 A three-judge district
court 27 ignored this evidence because of the untimely nature of its presenta-
tion 28 and upheld the general rulings of the ICC. While plaintiffs appealed
to the Supreme Court 29 the ICC undertook a review of the alleged irregulari-
ties.30 The Court later dismissed the appeal on the parties' own motion,
81 and
the Commission has yet to render an opinion on the alleged irregularities.
Whether fact or fantasy, however, these allegations reveal the practices made
possible by the ICC rules and, coupled with financial obstacles to effective
minority opposition, suggest that the requirement of security holder approval
may be an illusory safeguard against unfair 20b plans.
Oral Solicitation
Plaintiffs in the Sakis case argued that Congress had forbidden oral solicita-
tion in 20b campaigns via its statutory requirement that all letters, circulars,
26. In its position as statutory defendant of any action brought to restrain enforce-
ment of an' Interstate Commerce Commission order (62 STAT. 970 (1948), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2323 (Supp. 1950)), the Justice Department originally filed a pro forma answer to the
Sakis suit, generally upholding the Commission's stand. For reasons that are not apparent,
the Department then embarked on a surprisingly intense investigation of solicitation and
recording activities in the Boston & Maine reorganization, and employed antitrust and
FBI offices throughout the country to take affidavits. (Questioning of railroad and de-
positary officials may have been facilitated by a mistaken notion on their part that the
Government was seeking evidence in support of the Boston & ,Maine plan.) Shortly be-
fore the court hearing, the Justice Department amended its answer to "confess error" on
the issue as to whether the proper number of assents had been legally attained, but con-
tinued to support the Conimission in upholding the constitutionality of 20b. Counsel for
the Boston & Maine and the Old Colony Trust Company (the road's depositary) strenu-
ously fought the Government's attempt both to confess error and to present its evidence
to the court. See, e.g., Motions on Behalf of Boston & Maine R,R. passhi, Memorandum
on Behalf of Intervenor Old Colony Trust Company in Support of its Motion to Strike
passim, Sakis v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1952). For a brief discussion of
the legal and factual issues concerned in "confession of error" situations, see Stern, "In.
coikistency" in Government Litigation, 64 HAgV. L. REv. 759 (1951).
27. The Judicial Code provides for three-judge determination of any action in which
either an interlocutory or permanent injunction is sought to restrain the enforcement of an
Interstate Commerce Commission order "other than for the payment of money or the
collection of fines, penalties and forfeitures." 62 STAT. 970 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §2321
(Supp. 1950).
28. The Justice Department investigation commenced after the ICC had terminated
its proceedings, see note 26 supra, and Government affidavits were presented for the first
time in court hearings. Since the court deemed its function to be that of merely reviewing
an administrative record, it refused to consider the Justice Department allegations as
original evidence. Sakis v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 292, 313-14 (D.D.C. 1952).
29. 21 U.S.L. WEnK 3048 (U.S. Aug. 12, 1952).
30. 66 ICC ANN. REP. 40 (1952).
31. Sakis v. United States, 344 U.S. 801 (1952). ICC records indicate that the )lain-
tiffs received a cash settlement from the Boston & Maine. 66 ICC ANN. RnP. 40-1 (1952).
(Vol. 62
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advertisements and "other communications" receive Commission approval be-
fore transmission to security owners. Since oral communications obviously
cannot be so approved, plaintiffs contended they were excluded from 20b
use. 2 The Sakis court denied this claim by interpreting "other communica-
tions" to mean only written matter, and revealed the motive for its decision
in a pointed discussion of the difficulty of management's task in obtaining the
required high percentage of assents without the use of personal solicitation.3
The court recognized that abuses might accompany oral persuasion, but found
assurance of safety in the fact that solicited owners could check the validity
of any oral allegation by referring to approved written statements. 4
Though the Sakis court was quite correct in finding no specific statutory
prohibition of oral solicitation-Congress, in fact, never considered the mat-
ter 3---there is good reason to justify judicial interpolation of such a ban. The
only assurance of a full and fair presentation of 20b plans to security holders
lies in the provision for a prior ICC check over both the "correctness and
sufficiency" of solicitation communications. 30 No criminal sanctions exist to
32. Brief for Plaintiffs, pp. 20-1, Sakis v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C.
1952).
33. Salis v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 292, 305 (D.D.C. 1952).
34. Ibid. Section 20b itself does not oblige carriers to submit written communicationq
to security holders, but it seems likely that the ICC will require this in every case.
35. As far as can be determined, discussion of ICC supervision of campaign communi-
cations occurred only once in years of committee hearings and floor debates on 20b and its
predecessor proposals. On that occasion, managers of the Mahaffie bill told the Senate
that it was not their intent to establish Commission censorship over "normal or ordinary
correspondence between a carrier and a stockholder." 94 Co.c. REc. 321 (1943). This
statement sheds little light on congressional attitudes toward mass oral solicitation.
36. A legislative policy against oral solicitation may be inferred from this require-
ment. Compare the provision for a prior ICC check over both the "correctness and suffi-
ciency' of campaign communications with the regulations governing Section 77 solicita-
tion efforts in 49 CODE F m. REGs. § 58.1-12 (1949), which require no prior ICC approval
of solicitation arguments, although the statute does require that copies of the reorgani-
zation plan and the court's order be mailed to creditors and shareholders. 47 STAT. 1474
(1933), 11 U.S.C. §205(e) (1946). Nor must solicitation arguments in Chapter X re-
organizations be submitted for prior agency censorship, although no solicitation may begin
until creditors and shareholders receive copies of the plan and the court opinion approving
the plan. 52 STAT. 891 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§575-6 (1946). Moreover, the supervision
provided in Schedule 14A and Rule X-14A-9 of the well-knovn SEC rules for proxy
regulation, 17 CODE FED. REGs. §§ 240.14a-1 ct seq. (1933), applied to solicitations under
§ 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. S95 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 7Sn(a)
(Supp. 1951), § 12(e) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 824
(1935), 15 U.S.C. §79(k) (Supp. 1951), and § 20(a) of the Investment Company Act of
1940, 54 STAT. 322 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-20 (Supp. 1951). requires only that the com-
pany disclose certain minimal facts and refrain from using "false and misleading" state-
ments. The seemingly stronger statutory safeguard in 20b may indicate that Congress
intended that only the most closely supervised communications-which oral persuasion
could never be---should reach security holders.
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deter the use of false and misleading arguments. 87 Yet oral solicitation, so
conducive to misleading argument and innuendo, can nullify the sole check
Congress imposed. Solicitors, particularly when paid on a sliding scale cor-
related to the number of assents they acquire, 8 can be expected to exercise
every possible wile of oral persuasion.3 9 This expectancy is borne out by the
justice Department investigation of the Boston & Maine campaign which re-
vealed startling instances of oral misrepresentation of the value of Boston &
Maine stock 40 and the carrier's financial position.41 In addition, solicitors
allegedly offered fantastic inducements to obtain assents: one promised a job
with the Boston & Maine and a loan to the son of a security holder ;42 on
another occasion both a position on the board of directors and lowered ship-
37. The wording of § 20b(9) which rendered the SEC's proxy rules inapplicable to
20b proceedings also prevents the application of the criminal sanctions of the Securities
Exchange Act to 20b campaign tactics. Nothing in § 20b's legislative history indicates
that this was the intended result. Compare the stringent criminal penalties guarding rail-
road reorganizations under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. §205 (p) (1946).
38. The ICC has approved the practice of compensating the solicitor according to the
number of assents he acquires. See, e.g., Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Securities Modifica-
tion, 275 I.C.C. 369, 378 n.2 (1950).
39. For a suggestion of the other motives that may impel an extraordinary effort by
paid solicitors to bring about the success of 20b plans, see Letter of B&M-1l (a paid
solicitor for the Boston & Maine), dated November 8, 1950, Exhibit 2, Deposition of
B&M-11, p. 14, October 17, 1951, photostatic copy on file in Yale Law Library: "You
will see from careful reading of my report that ... a large block of new [B&M] $5. pfd.
and new [B&M] common [will soon be] for sale. I am to have first chance at it."
40. Solicitors gave common stockholders throughout the nation varying estimates of
the value of Boston & Maine shares. E.g., Affidavits of B&M shareholders, photostatic
copies of which are on file in the Yale Law Library: B&M-1, dated November 28, 1951
(75 cents a share); B&M-2, dated November 28, 1951 (25 cents a share); B&M-3,
dated October 2, 1951 (12 cents a share); B&M-4, dated December 2, 1951 ("under
water") ; B&M-5, dated November 28, 1951 ("practically worthless"). In the late months
of 1950 when these representations were made, Boston & Maine common stock sold on the
New York Stock Exchange at prices ranging from 2 to 37 dollars per share. See,
e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1950, p. 23, col. 2; Dec. 2, 1950, p. 19, col. 3.
41. "The man who called me, in urging me to assent, stated in effect that it would
be better to reorganize the railroad than to have it go into bankruptcy proceedings," AffM-
davit of B&M-6, common shareholder, dated November 27, 1951, photostatic copy on file
in Yale Law Library. Compare the conclusions of the ICC: "It is conceded by the appli-
cant, and not disputed by any of the interveners, that the need for readjustment of its
capital stock structure is niot forced on it by reason of any threat of insolvency. On the
contrary, it clearly appears that the applicant is in good physical condition, and the evi-
dence justifies the conclusion, generally accepted by the parties, that the applicant's funded
debt structure, while perhaps susceptible to further improvement, is sound," Boston &
Maine R.R. Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C. 397, 412 (1950). Thus, statements which
never would have received ICC approval for insertion in written 20b communications,
reach solicited owners with ease via the back door of personal visit.




ping rates were the implied consideration for the shareholder's assent.4 3 And
some stockholders were exposed to unremitting solicitor badgering." More-
over, even with criminal sanctions, the SEC has experienced frequent abuce
43. "Q. Did the discussions between you and [the solicitor] at any time revolve
around the directors of the railroad? A. Oh, yes ... he saw he couldn't get anywhere
with me and he said there were two vacancies in the Boston & Maine Railroad director-
ship, and he said he believed he can get me one on the board. Q. On the bLard oi direc-
tors? A. Yes, and also if I was shipping any stuff, merchandise, thrvugh the Bost.,n &
'Maine Railroad he would get me a cheaper rate. .. .. . Now, did there c,-m2 a time
when [he] discussed with you the question of whether or not you might go to B't,
Massachusetts, for any reason? A. Oh. yes, he wanted to show me the ,:orkinlgs of the
railroad and he said, 'Any time you want to make arrangements it is up to you. You can
stay with your wife two or three days in Boston. We will put you up in a hotel and
entertain you and try to make it very convenient for you.' He did try to make it very
convenient for me, and he also sent ... [my wife] flowers. Q. Now, with respect to the
proposed trip to Boston, who was to pay the expenses? A. The Boston & Maine Rail-
road." Deposition of B&--7, pp. 8-9, dated November 8, 1951, photostatic c,py on file
in Yale Law Library. Deponent actually made the trip to Boston, where he %,as met by
three officers of the Boston & Maine Railroad. Id. at 11-14. "n. Incidentally, who paid
for the drinks? A. I think the Boston & Maine Railroad did that." Id. at 17. "Q. Who
paid your bill at the Manger Hotel [in Boston], your hotel bill for the room? A. I don't
know. I don't think- I paid for it." Id. at 20.
44. "He [the solicitor] came about four times when I actually let him in and ten or
twelve times when I refused to let him in." Affidavit of B"fM-2, dated November 23,
1951, photostatic copy on file in Yale Law Library. Other shareholders were phoned or
visited, c.g., at least nine times, Affidavit of B&M-3, dated October 2, 1951; "several
times," Affidavit of B&M--S, dated September 5, 1951, photostatic copies on file in Yale
Law Library. "[We] don't think it [solicitation] can be done by phone but will reluire
personal calls, perhaps several times...." Letter from Georgeson & Co. (a E ,licitati*n
firm) to the Boston & Maine R.R., dated October 9, 1950, Exhibit 1, Derositida of
Richard Nye, photostatic copy on file in Yale Law Library.
Other solicitor tactics: "He... told me that the necessary percentage of stekhAders
was assenting to the reorganization plan anyway, but that as of the day he was talking t.
me the railroad still lacked the assent of a few of the stockholders, and he would there-
fore appreciate my signing the letter of assent and returning it immediately... He then
said that my failure to sign the assent was holding up the reorganiation plan, and that,
since enough of the stockholders were going to assent anyway, the sooner the railrvad got
the necessary percentage of stock-holders to assent, the sooner the re-organizati,.m would
be effected for the benefit of both the railroad and all the shareholders." Affidavit f
B&M-9, dated November 27, 1951, photostatic copy on file in Yale Law. Library. At
approximately the same time, a partner in one of the road's chief solicitation firms wrute
the road: "Franldy, I just don't know how you're going to get the necessary assents."
Exhibit 1, attached to Deposition of Richard Nye, photostatic copy on file in Yale Law
Library. Another shareholder was told that Mr. George Sakis (principal opp-nent of the
Boston & Maine's plan) had assented to the 20b modification. "When I heard that,"
testified the shareholder, "I signed right away." Deposition of B&M-10, p. 87, dated
November 8, 1951, photostatic copy on file in Yale Law Library.
W7ealthy, well-informed investors were apparently immune to these arguments. See
Letter from Georgeson & Co. (a solicitation firm) to the Boston & Maine Railrvad,
dated October 9, 1951, Exhibit 1, Deposition of Richard Nye, photostatic copy on
file in Yale Law Library: "So far we have only solicited brokers plus two or three larger
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of oral solicitation in proxy battles.45 Furthermore, the Sakis court's reliance
upon the accuracy check afforded by written communications is of dubious
wisdom in view of common psychological evidence of the superior persuasive-
ness of oral argument.
46
Ideally, oral solicitation should be forbidden. 47 Short of this, Congress or
the Commission should erect strong safeguards against abuse. A prohibition
of solicitor contracts which make compensation contingent upon success in
obtaining assents might minimize inducements for misleading statements; oral
solicitation might await prior receipt by the security holder of the written
statements of all factions; personal visits could be limited to one appearance
in place of repeated solicitor pressuring. If money and manpower are avail-
able, ICC spot checks on oral solicitation practices also should accompany each
20b campaign. And Congress could contribute criminal and civil liability for
the oral use of false and misleading statements to supplement inadequate state
actions for deceit.
48
stockholders where [we] had an entree.... [Those] we have contacted have only one
come-back-they ask satirically for the reasons they should go along as to a plan that
will make their stock worth 50 cents when they can sell it in the market for $2.50....
As [we] see it, our best prospects are among the smaller stockholders scattered through-
out the country." See note 11 supra.
45. See, e.g., the account of the struggle for control of the Sparks-Withington Com-
pany in Emerson & Latcham, Further Insight into More Effective Stockholder Partici-
pation: The Sparks-Withington Proxy Contest, 60 YALE L.J. 429 (1951), where manage-
ment solicitors allegedly offered free Sparton television sets for shareholder proxies. Id.
at 449-50.
46. See KLAPPER, THE EFFEcTS OF MASS MEDIA pt. 2, p. 10 (1949); LAzAasFmiv,
BERELSON & GAUDET, THE PEOPLE'S CHoIcE 129, 150-1 (1948); Wilke, An Experinental
Comparison of the Speech, the Radio, and the Printed Page as Propagaanda Devices in
ARCHIVES OF PSYCHOLOGY No. 169 (1934).
47. Oral solicitation by management seems especially unfair because of the practical
inability of any group other than management to make use of it. Refusal by the ICC to
compel corporate reimbursement of the expenses of opposition groups, see note 21 supra,
renders prohibitive any effort orally to persuade widespread dissent to a proposed modi-
fication. More importantly, the ICC has apparently reversed an earlier policy of requiring
carrier disclosure of security holder names to opposition committees, Macon, Dublin &
Savannah R.R. Bond Modification, 271 I.CC. 376, 384 (1948), and now permits the rail-
road an alternative of mailing dissent literature, at dissenters' expense, in place of actually
furnishing security holder lists. See note 20 su pra. Opposition groups, consequently,
might be forced to use cumbersome state proceedings in order to seek the names and
addresses of stockholders for purposes of oral solicitation. See BALLANTINE, COu'ORuA-
Tioxs §§ 159-67 (1946). And no state-recognized right to obtain the names and locations
of bondholders exists. The inability to obtain lists of investors from management has
been labeled one of the historical abuses of reorganization proceedings, Delatour v. Merl-
deth, 144 F.2d 594, 596 (2d Cir. 1944). See SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDv AND INVESTIGATION
OF THE WORK, AcrivriEs, PERSONNEL AND FUNCrIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZA-
TION COmmITEES pt. 1, 408-57 (1937).
48. Since no criminal sanctions are presently contained in 20b, see note 37 supra, use
of the most blatantly false and misleading oral allegations is limited only by common-law
actions for deceit, the shortcomings of which were sharply highlighted in Shulman, Civil
Liability and the Securities Act, 45 YALE L.J. 227 (1933).
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The "Purchase" of Assents
Misleading oral enticements may prove to be among the less e-treme abuses
of the solicitation process; pressure on solicitors to obtain the requisite assents
seems to have induced a dubious manipulation of stock market trading prac-
tices as well. The Justice Department investigation of the Boston & Maine
campaign reveals that paid solicitors occasionally offered above-market prices
for the stocks of non-assenters on condition that the holders assent their securi-
ties before the sale.49 After purchase, the securities were apparently resold at
a loss, 0 with only the negligible risk that a later purchaser would taLe
the trouble to revoke the assent before the end of the solicitation period. And
it seems reasonable to infer that losses suffered in these transactions were
later included in solicitation "expenses" paid from corporate funds. The same
technique may have been used to bypass in spirit, but perhaps not in form,
20b's prohibition against counting into the voting total the securities "con-
trolled" by the carrier or any person "controlling" the carrier. Upon receiv-
ing refusals to assent, solicitors often purchased hold-out securities at above-
market prices for the accounts of company directors?' Again, the sale was
made contingent upon the holder's prior assent to the 20b plan ;-2 as a result,
49. E.g., "I want to make it clear that I would not have assented my 2700 share.s C4f
B & M common stock except for the fact that it was bought from me above market and I
also want to make it clear that a condition of such sale was that I assent this st, J: befire
signing." Affidavit of B&M-S-,_, dated September 5, 1951, pht<static cpy on file in Yale
Law Library (stock with market value of between 27 and 314 sod for 4).
50. As an example of solicitor loss transactions, see Dep,.sition of richard S. Xye
(a paid solicitor), p. 77, dated October 19, 1951, phttostutie c,,py on file in Yale Law
Library, in which the admission is made that stock was bought and svd on the same day
on the stock exchange at a loss--"the major purpose" of the transaction being to ac.Eent
the stock.
51. See, e.g., Deposition of B01-7, pp. 25-9, 37-8, dated Nt'venfier 8, 1951, photo-
static copy on file in Yale Law Library: Depositi,,n of B&M-11, pp. 32-47, dated Oct. !er
17, 1951, photostatic copy on file in Yale Law Library; Affidavit of B&M-12, dated,
November 2, 1951, photostatic copy on file in Yale Law., Library.
52. See, e.g., Deposition of B&M-7, pp. 37-8, dated November 8, 1951, phutostatic
copy on file in Yale Law Library.
Whether director purchases actually violated 20b's "control" provisions, however, is
uncertain. The ICC initially had stated that no shares were held by persons in control
of the carrier. Boston & Maine R.R. Securities 'Modificatihn, -75 I.C.C. 397, 424 (195 i.
But the subsequent purchase of additional shares during the sdicitatin campaign might
have placed directors in this category. In making its earlier finding that no Bustun &
Maine directors controlled the railroad, the ICC-somewhat surprisingly-did not force
the directors to reveal their holdings of B & M6 stock. Trial Brief of Defendant, The
United States, pp. 28-9, Sakis v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1952). The
Commission's conduct is even more startling in view of interpretations given control
language in other contexts. See, generally, Comment, 60 YALE UJ. 311 (1951). Offical
position creates no legal presumption of control, but "is a sort of red light." Loss, Srcc-
RIT Es REGuLAT O N 467 (1951). ICC attitudes might be explained, huwever, by the fact
that the Commission has repeatedly urged elimination of the control prvisin from 24iJ.
See, e.g., 65 ICC ANN. REP. 35 (1951).
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assents "controlled" by .directors were recorded under the prior holder's name.
A third technique employed the common borrowing transaction ordinarily
utilized for the practice of short-selling on the stock exchanges.53 Solicitors,
through a broker, borrowed stock held in the "street name" of another broker-
age firm; upon payment of a transfer tax, the stock was listed in the name
of the solicitor's broker, assented, and then returned :54 thus, in at least one
instance, Boston & Maine securities apparently were assented without the
knowledge of a beneficial owner who happened to be strongly opposed to
the plan.5s Such practices may only partially exhaust the store of possible
manipulations. And barring intensive investigations, the ICC will ordinarily
remain unaware of most of these methods: assents are received from "proper-
ly" listed security holders, while solicitor expense reports may easily conceal
the relatively small costs incurred in both loss and borrowing transactions."0
Positive deterrents can be erected to check such practices. Solicitor dealings
in the carrier's securities during the solicitation period should be forbidden.5 7
53. Borrowing permits the delivery of securities the seller does not yet own. See
SH LTz, THE SECURITIES MARxm'T 178-83 (5th ed. 1946).
54. Borrowing transactions were directed by Richard S. Nye, a partner in the firm of
Georgeson & Co., which had been hired by the B & M to solicit assents to its reorganiza-
tion plan. Nye used his wife's name and her broker accounts in two major borrowing
operations: 1) a loan in November, 1950, of 1300 shares of B &'M comnon stock from
the brokerage firm of Bache & Co. in Philadelphia, which were then transferred to Shields
& Co. in New York, to Laidlaw & Co., and finally to Montgomery, Scott & Co.; and 2)
a loan, in the closing days of the Boston & Maine campaign period, of 2000 shares from
Sartorius & Co., transferred to Gude, Windmill & Co., to Pyne, Kendall & Hollister in
New York. All stock involved in these transactions was held in brokers' street names,
but owned by individual shareholders. Reports of the foregoing are found in Affidavit
of Robert E. Bird, Cashier of Gude, Windmill & Co., dated September 21, 1951, photo-
static copy on file in Yale Law Library, and in Deposition of Richard S. Nye, pp. 3, 17,
19-29, 35-42, 48, dated October 19, 1951, photostatic copy on file in Yale Law Library.
Earlier, Nye had left standing orders with brokers to assent all B &M stock that came
into his wife's accounts. Deposition of Richard S. Nye, pp. 17, 37, 43-4, 74-5, dated
October 19, 1951, photostatic copy on file in Yale Law Library. The depositary thus
received and counted assents for 1300 shares held by Montgomery, Scott & Co. on Decem-
ber 1, 1950, Deposition of John Coulson (depositary employee), p. 49, dated October 16,
1951, photostatic copy on file in Yale Law Library, and for 2000 shares held by Pyne,
Kendall & Hollister, on December 14, 1950, the last day of the submission period. See
Deposition of Elizabeth Walker (depositary employee), p. 23, dated October 18, 1951,
photostatic copy on file in Yale Law Library.
55. 1000 of the 1300 shares borrowed from Bache & Co. and then assented were owned
by Charles I. Podgor, a member of the Sakis committee. Affidavit of Charles I. Podgor,
dated December 6, 1951, photostatic copy on file in Yale Law Library.
56. The federal borrowing tax amounts to 5 cents per $100 of par or face value of
the stocks and bonds borrowed, or 5 cents for each no par share. No tax is imposed
on the return of bonds, nor are there any state taxes on the borrowing and return of either
stocks or bonds. See SHULTZ, op. cit. supra note 53, at 226.
57. A similar prohibition, Rule U-62(g) (2), is already part of the SEC rules for
solicitations under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. 17 CoDE Fim. RiEas.
§ 250.62(g) (2) (1949).
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Criminal sanctions by Congress might prove a helpful deterrent to violations.
And to forestall director purchases made contingent on prior assent, where
the director has or thereby acquires a "controlling" interest in the carrier,
the ICC should require full disclosure of director purchases, the manner of
purchase (on the open market or from individual holders), and prices paid.-"
This information would facilitate investigation of possible malpractices.
Inspection of Executed Assents
The ICC delegates the actual recording of assents to "independent deposi-
taries"--usually trust companies recommended by applicant carriers-to which
security holders mail their approval of the proposed modification. 9 Notice
of acquisition of the requisite votes is relayed to the Commission through the
affidavits of the railroad and depositary presidents ;tO the ICC itself has never
inspected assents. When opponents of the Boston & Maine plan asked to ex-
amine these votes in open hearings, their request was denied. The Commission
based its refusal upon a fear of "unjustified" delay since the opposition group
was unable to support its motion with specific allegations of irregularities in
the assent count.', However, the Commission did not explain how dissenters.
unable to inspect assents, could ever gain the information needed for such
charges.
The Sakis court nevertheless found no abuse of administrative discretion
in the ICC's action because 20b had no specific requirement for a hearing on
recordation accuracy. -0 2 And to rebut plaintiffs' contention that sections of the
Administrative Procedure Act independently required such a hearing 63 the
court relied on the APA's exemption of "proceedings in which decisions rest
solely on inspections, tests or elections"'3 from the hearing provisionsFc5
58. The Securities Exchange Act's insider trading provisions require only that c, r-
porate directors file periodic reports of a change in their holdings. The price of recent
purchases and the method of purchase need not be shown. See Loss, Srcunmx RoTu-
LATIoN 562-3 (1951).
59. See, e.g., Macon, Dublin & Savannah R.R. Bond Modification, 271 I.C.C. 376,
383 (1949) (to be mailed to Mercantile Trust Co. of Baltimore, Md.) ; Central R.R. of
N.J. Securities Modification, 271 I.C.C. 501, 529 (1949) (to be mailed to "such person,
firm, or corporation, satisfactory to us, as may be selected by the applicant.")
60. See, e.g., Montana, Wyoming & Southern R.R. Securities Modification, 271 I.CC.
779, 794 (1949) : "[TIhe applicant, within a reasonable time after the closing of the sub-
mission period, shall submit to us in connection with a supplemental application, a certi-
ficate as to the principal amount of affected bonds whose holders have assented to the
plan as amended and the percentage thereof to the total principal amount outstanding.
Such certificate shall be supported by a like certification by the Empire Trust Company
[the depositary] which shall also be submitted to us."
61. Boston & Maine R.R. Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C. 752, 756 (1951).
62. Sakis v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 292, 309 (D.D.C. 1952).
63. 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (Supp. 1950).
64. 60 STAT. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(3) (Supp. 1950).
65. Sakis v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 292, 309 (D.D.C 1952).
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Though literally covered by this exemption, its application to assent recording
under 20b could have been avoided. No legislative history clarifies the excep-
tion, but a fairly obvious interpretation would limit it to proceedings directed
by the administrative agency itself. To rely upon the naked affidavits of pri-
vate parties is to make the questionable assumption that the APA's confidence
in the impartiality, care, and skill of a public regulatory body extends to the
functions of a profit-seeking trust company, paid by an interested 20b parti-
cipant.60
Apart from the legal issue, however, the possibility of undetected multiple
assents on a single security, as well as unauthorized assents by purported
agents, would suggest a needed revision of Commission attitudes. Under the
conditions of large-scale stock market trading, a considerable percentage of
stock and bond certificates, instead of being delivered to their purchasers,
are held by brokers and listed in a broker's "street name."06T When assents
were received for less than the total amount of a broker's "street name" shares,
the Boston & Maine's depositary did not compel the broker to submit the
certificate numbers of the assented shares. 8 Resold, the same shares might
have been assented again, since the carrier and depositary themselves had de-
cided that a later transferee of a portion of the "street name" holdings would
be presumed to have purchased unassented shares. 0 Moreover, many assents
were signed by brokers, attorneys, and the like who claimed to act on the
authorization of the beneficial owner. The depositary apparently made no
effort to spot check the purported authorizations 0-° an understandable omis-
66. See note 71 infra.
67. In 1937, 10 percent of the stock of all American corporations, and 20 percent of
the stock beneficially owned by individuals, was reported under the "street names" of
brokerage firms. See Investigation of Concentration of Econonnic Poner (Monog. No,
29) in TNEC, DisimuIxoN OF OWNERSHIP IN THE 200 LARGEST NONFINANCIAL, Co01,-
PoRAToNs 9 (1940). See also KrmiMEL, SHARE OWNERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATS 55-
62 (1952).
68. Deposition of Cecil Covert, pp. 28-34, dated October 18, 1951, photostatic copy Oil
file in Yale Law Library.
69. Deposition of Raymond A. McIntire, pp. 105-12, dated October 17, 1951, photo-
static copy on file in Yale Law Library.
70. Deposition of John Coulson, pp. 32-37, 113-14, 117, 142, dated October 16, 1951;
Deposition of Raymond A. Mclntire, pp. 27, 77, dated October 17, 1951, photostatic copies
on file in Yale Law Library. In failing to require proof of authorization, the depositary
disregarded a printed provision on ICC-approved assent forms, stating: "Note: In all
cases in which the Letter of Assent is executed by an officer of a corporation, admlnis-
trator, executor, trustee, guardian, agent, attorney or others acting in a fiduciary or rep-
resentative capacity, proper evidence of authority to act in such capacity must be fur-
nished." LrTTER OF ASSENT FOR STocKHoLDEns, photostatic copy on file in Yale Law
Library. A depositary official testified that, though the requirement was on the face of
the assent, "the matter had been cleared up with the Railroad," which had advised non-
observance. Deposition of John Coulson, p. 6, dated October 18, 1951, photostatic copy
on file in Yale Law Library.
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sion in view of the business ties between the carrier and depositary, making
the depositary anxious to have the plan accepted. 1
The ICC can maintain the integrity of the assent recording process. An
accurate 20b count could be guaranteed if assenting owners were required to
mail original securities certificates to the depositary in exchange for documents
of deposit 72--a precaution that has been used in railroad reorganizations under
Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act.73 Perhaps less drastic than surrender of
certificates would be assurance of open and continuous access to depositary
records for all investor groups. Such access would permit dissenters to deter-
mine the extent of perhaps widespread double voting and to check on the
validity of authorizations by beneficial owners.
Reimbursement of Opposition Expenses
Soon after 20b's enactment, the Commission interpreted the absence of a
reimbursement clause in the statute as a positive prohibition, holding that it
lacked the power to require corporate payment for the expenses of opposition
committees.74 Sakis later sustained this position as a reasonable exercise of
administrative discretion.75 Consequently, while management proponents of
a 20b plan may utilize company funds to finance mass solicitation efforts,c
71. That the ICC has been somewhat lax in its choice of "independent" depositarks
is suggested by the fact that T. Jefferson Coolidge, member of the executive c,.mmittee of
the Boston & MXNaine's board of directors, is also a director of the Old Cobny Trust Com-
pany, the independent depositary. Poon's REGISTER OF Dir.ros.' %,.D Ex-IC.Vm'Es 161.
947 (1953). Both Coolidge and Edward S. French, President of the B,,stin & Maine.
are directors of the First National Bank of Boston, which owns the Old 0C. ny Trust
Company. Id. at 461. The Old Colony is also the road's transfer agent, as are most de-
positaries in 20b proceedings. Yet in denying the dissenters an opp:rtunity to inspect
assents, the Commission said: "The designation and appointment of a depositary was mad
in order to insure that the receipt and computation of assents would be carried out 4y a
responsible and independent agency.. .. " Boston & .Maine R.R. Securities Mtdificati n
275 I.C.C. 752, 755 (1951).
72. That Congress may have intended that documents of deposit would be used in
20b campaigns is suggested by the statutory provision, Sectiun 20b(1l ), exempting such
certificates from Securities Act regulation.
73. Interviews with ICC official and members of the ICC Bar (Summer. 1952).
74. See note 21 supra.
75. Salts v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 292, 313 (D.D.C. 1952).
76. The ICC has said that it is "unable to supply . . . informatiun concerning the
total expenses incurred by the several carriers in soliciting assents to the approved m.2di-
fication plans." Communication to the Y..LE LAw JOW'RxAL from C. E. Boles, Directur,
Bureau of Finance, Interstate Commerce Commission, dated February 20, 1953, on file in
Yale Law Library. The statement does not indicate clearly whether it is Commission
policy to withhold such information, or whether the ICC has simply neglected to require
such data from successful 20b applicants. Commission opinions, uf ckurse, have carried
railroad estimates of projected expenses, including a fairly definitive repvrt by the Boston
& Aaine that it foresaw the need to spend $66,780.86 in bringing ahi ut a completcd moldi-
fication. Boston & Maine R.R. Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C. 752, 757 (1951). Ex-
penses in other 20b campaigns-particularly the Lehigh Valley proceeding-are rumoured
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opposing groups must themselves defray the costs both of arguing before the
Commission and soliciting opposition to management's drive for assents.
While apparently immune from judicial attack, the ICC's stand is neither
warranted by congressional intent nor a wise policy for administering 20b's
consent provisions. Though Congress took adverse note of the excessive "pro-
tective committee" expenses that so often accompanied traditional forms of
bankruptcy reorganization, 77 20b's legislative history implies no clear purpose
to abolish payment of these fees altogether. 78 On the contrary, ICC power to
alter all "terms and conditions" of a submitted plan 70 seems to establish full
ICC discretion over this, as well as other features of 20b campaigns. Policy-
wise, the failure to provide for repayment of legal, printing, and mailing costs
will almost certainly deter opposition groups* from presenting their views to
security holders. Unilateral use of corporate funds by management proponents
thus might permit only favorable arguments to reach solicited owners; the
resulting assents might then fail to reflect the informed judgment that alone
permits the assent requirement to perform a truly protective function.
The ICC's refusal to reimburse is probably based upon a fear that the lure
of legal fees and costs will draw officious and unnecessary parties into 20b
proceedings. But such abuses are not inherent in reimbursement provisions;
they may be regulated. Although the varying motives and interests of security
holders would preclude forcing all opposition groups into a single committee
to have run much higher. Confidential Interview (Fall, 1952). It is the ICC's position
that it has no power to approve or disapprove the expenditures of carriers in 20b cam-
paigns "unless perhaps unconscionable." Brief for the Interstate Commerce Commission,
p. 39, Sakis v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1952).
77. See MODIFICATION OF RAILROAD FINANCIAL STRUCrURES, SEN. RE'. No. 1170,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 55-58 (1946) ; Hearings before Special Subcommittee on Bankruptcy
and Reorganization of the Committee o the Judiciary on H.R. 3237, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
73 (1947). Exorbitant legal fees and costs have always constituted a prime source of
dissatisfaction with traditional forms of corporate reorganization. Classic critiques of these
abuses are found in SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION 0F THE WORx, Ac-
TIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION CoMM,.xTrErs
pt. I, 161-242 (1937) ; ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITA lISMi 230, 252-9 (1937) ; LOWEN-
TEAL, THE INVESTOR PAYS 255-68 (1933).
78. On the one hand, the absence of a ban against reimbursement could be construed
as indicating congressional approval for the payment of dissenters' costs. In vetoing a
predecessor bill to 20b, President Harry S. Truman specifically castigated the vetoed
measure for failing to bar the repayment of excessive fees and expenses, and asked that
any new reorganization legislation contain "[a]ffirmative provisions to curb this evil .... "
See Memorandum of Disapproval, Hearings before Subcommittee on ritterstate and For-
eign Comnnwrce on S. 249, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1947). No reimbursement prohibition
was enacted into 20b. On the other hand, a specific reimbursement section was placed in
Chapter XV of the Bankruptcy Act in 1942, 56 STAT. 790-1 (1942), after expiration of
the 1939 version of Chapter XV, which contained no such provision. 53 STAT. 1134
(1939). Thus, the legislative history of 20b and its predecessors manifests no clear in-
tent in either direction.
79. Section 20b(3), quoted in note 15 supra.
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for purposes of argument before the Commission and solicitation campaigns,
a reasonable compromise might require single representation in solicitation
activities for holders of a particular class of securities. Similarly, the Com-
mission could place ceilings on reimbursable expenses. And discretion can
easily be retained to disallow reimbursement claims of parties who have entered
a 20b campaign for frivolous or harassing reasons.
Conchtsion
Solicitation practices now possible under ICC rules render 20b's assent
requirement a paper shield for the small investor's protection. But the choice
of solicitation safeguards must be made with an eye toward their impact on
the utility of 20b. Investor lethargy rather than opposition may cause a car-
rier's written communications to be ignored; inertia might deter investors from
surrendering stock and bond certificates if surrender were required to signify
assent. Thus an absolute ban against oral solicitation or a surrender require-
ment might preclude attainment of the requisite assents. However, other less
drastic precautions might suffice to provide effective regulation of assent solici-
tation without emasculating whatever usefulness 20b may possess. The ICC
has a reservoir of discretionary power to implement these measures. And
Congress should also act where criminal or civil sanctions appear necessary.
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